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Abstract
We conduct a sequential social-learning experiment where subjects take turns guess-
ing a hidden state based on private signals and the guesses of a subset of their prede-
cessors. A network determines the observable predecessors, and we compare subjects’
accuracy on sparse and dense networks. Accuracy gains from social learning are twice
as large on sparse networks compared to dense networks. Models of naive inference
where agents ignore correlation between observations predict this comparative static in
network density, while the finding is difficult to reconcile with rational-learning models.
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1 Introduction
In many economic situations, people form beliefs based on others’ actions. In these set-
tings, agents typically do not observe all members of the society, but only a select subset —
namely, their neighbors in an underlying social network. How the structure of this observa-
tion network affects learning outcomes is a fundamental question for understanding social
learning. While an extensive theoretical literature has explored this question for both naive
and rational agents (e.g., Golub and Jackson, 2010; Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar,
2011; Golub and Jackson, 2012), much less is known empirically.
Density is one of the most basic properties of a network. How do learning patterns dif-
fer between sparse networks, where agents usually observe very few neighbors, and dense
networks, where agents generally have abundant social information? On denser networks,
agents observe more predecessors (both directly and indirectly), so their actions can incorpo-
rate the private signals of more individuals. But whether this leads to more accurate learning
ultimately depends on how society aggregates these signals. In this work, we conduct an
experiment to compare social-learning outcomes on sparse and dense networks. We study
a sequential social-learning environment where agents on an observation network take turns
guessing a state. We find that although later agents have fewer observations on sparser net-
works, they nevertheless learn substantially better on sparse networks than dense networks.
We place subjects into groups of 40 who act in order. Each group lives on a social network,
with randomly-generated links that determine each subject’s observations. Each subject has
a 25% chance of observing each predecessor in the sparse treatment and a 75% chance in the
dense treatment (and subjects know these probabilities). A hidden binary state is drawn for
each group. On her turn, each subject must guess the state using her private signal and the
past guesses of the predecessors she observes. Subjects were paid for accuracy.
Prior to data collection, we pre-registered a measure of long-run learning accuracy: the
fraction of the final 8 subjects in the group who correctly guess the state. Comparing this
measure on 130 sparse networks versus 130 dense networks, we find that denser networks lead
to worse learning accuracy. In dense networks, the average accuracy of the last 8 subjects
improves on the autarky benchmark (i.e., the average accuracy if no one can observe others’
actions) by 5.7%, but this improvement is 12.6% in sparse networks. Thus, the long-run
accuracy gains from social learning are twice as large in the sparse treatment as in the dense
treatment (p-value 0.0239).
In addition to its direct implications about the role of network density in social learning,
this finding provides indirect evidence supporting models of naive inference in which agents
neglect the correlations among their social observations (as in Eyster and Rabin, 2010).
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Motivated by a theoretical result from Dasaratha and He (2019), we compute predictions
of the naive model. Later agents exhibit higher accuracy on sparse networks than dense
networks in this model, as in our experimental evidence. The basic intuition is that an
agent with correlation neglect ends up placing too much weight on the actions of the very
early movers, as these actions are a common source of influence for many of the agent’s
predecessors. When the network is denser, this over-weighting is more severe and so naive
agents’ guesses are less accurate in the long run.
On the other hand, our experimental findings are inconsistent with the rational social-
learning model. Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011)’s results imply that rational
agents learn asymptotically in environments matching our experimental setup. We adapt
their methods to provide lower bounds on the accuracy of rational agents 33 through 40 in
the sparse and dense treatments. These bounds imply that rational agents’ accuracy cannot
improve substantially from the dense-network treatment to the sparse-network treatment —
in particular, the rational model does not predict a doubling of accuracy gain.
Our data also show that network density has no statistically significant effect on the
overall accuracy averaged across all 40 subjects in each group. This is because dense networks
increase the accuracy of subjects who move early in the group, even though they lower the
accuracy of subjects who move later. This reversal of the accuracy ranking between sparse
and dense networks over the course of social learning is another prediction of naive inference.
1.1 Related Literature
Our experimental results add to a growing body of evidence that humans do not properly
account for correlations in social-learning settings. Enke and Zimmermann (2017) show that
correlation neglect is prevalent even in simple environments where the observed information
sources are mechanically correlated. In a field experiment where agents interact repeatedly
with the same set of neighbors, Chandrasekhar, Larreguy, and Xandri (2019) find agents fail
to account for redundancies.
Most closely related to the present work, the laboratory games in Eyster, Rabin, and
Weizsacker (2018) and Mueller-Frank and Neri (2015) directly evaluate the naive inference
behavioral assumption. Eyster, Rabin, and Weizsacker (2018) find that on the complete
observation network agents’ behavior is closer to the rational model than the naive model. On
a more complex network the naive model matches more observations than the rational model,
and there is little anti-imitation (which would be required for correct Bayesian inference).1
Mueller-Frank and Neri (2015) find most observations are consistent with naive inference
1In the complex network, four agents move in each period after observing predecessors from previous
periods.
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(which they call quasi-Bayesian updating) in a setting where agents have limited information
about the network. These experiments suggest naiveté may be more likely in settings where
agents either have a limited knowledge of the true network or the network is known but very
complicated. In these settings, the correct Bayesian belief given one’s observations can be
far from obvious, so agents are more likely to resort to behavioral heuristics.
Unlike this previous work, our experiment tests the comparative statics predictions of
naive and rational learning with respect to variations in the learning environment. This
allows us to cleanly test redundancy neglect against rational updating. Our approach allows
us to focus on long-term learning outcomes—which are the welfare-relevant metrics as we
consider changes in the environment—instead of solely on measuring individual behavior.
Several experiments in this literature, including Grimm andMengel (2018), Chandrasekhar,
Larreguy, and Xandri (2019), and Mueller-Frank and Neri (2015), test social learning out-
comes under multiple network structures. In these works, changes in network structure
largely serve as a robustness check for claims about subject behavior. By considering larger
networks and varying density, we show network structures play a large role in learning out-
comes and exploit this variation to better understand behavior.
2 Theoretical Motivation
2.1 Model
The state of the world ω ∈ {0, 1} takes one of two possible values with equal probabilities.
The set of agents is indexed by i ∈ N. Agents move in the order of their indices, each acting
once.
On her turn, each agent i observes a private signal si ∈ R, as well as the actions of some
previous agents. Then, i chooses an action ai ∈ {0, 1} to maximize the probability that
ai = ω given her belief about ω.
Private signals (si) are i.i.d. and Gaussian conditional on the state of the world. When
ω = 1, si ∼ N (1, σ2). When ω = 0, si ∼ N (−1, σ2). Here σ2 > 0 is the conditional variance
of the private signal.
In addition to her signal, each agent i observes the action of each predecessor with
probability q. These observations are i.i.d. Agents observed by i are called the neighbors of
i, and the sets of neighbors define a (random) directed network.
We compare two kinds of agents: rational agents and naive agents. Rational agents
play the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Naive agents optimize given the following
misspecified beliefs:
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Assumption 1 (Naive Inference Assumption). Each agent wrongly believes that each pre-
decessor chooses an action to maximize her expected payoff based solely on her private signal,
and not on her observation of other agents.
Equivalently, naive agents act as if each of their neighbors observes no other agents.
Besides the error in Assumption 1, naive agents are otherwise correctly specified and optimize
their expected utility given their mistaken beliefs.
Assumption 1 was introduced in a sequential learning setting where agents observe all
predecessors by Eyster and Rabin (2010). Their work refers to this form of inference as
“best-response trailing naive inference” (BRTNI).
2.2 Naive and Rational Behavior
Dasaratha and He (2019) suggest an empirical test for the naive inference assumption: in
the context of sequential learning on uniform random networks, does increasing the link-
formation probability q cause more inaccurate long-run beliefs? In this paper, we experimen-
tally test this comparative static in networks of 40 agents by comparing learning outcomes
in sparse networks (where q = 14) and dense networks (where q =
3
4).
The naive-learning model and the rational-learning model make competing predictions
about this comparative static. The intuition2 for naive learning comes from Dasaratha and
He (2019), which suggests that overweighting due to correlation neglect is more severe on
dense networks. We do not expect human subjects to behave exactly according to As-
sumption 1 — for example, the meta-analysis of Weizsäcker (2010) reports that laboratory
subjects in sequential learning games suffer from autarky bias, underweighting their social
observations relative to the payoff-maximizing strategy. However, the comparative static
prediction of the naive model remains robust even after introducing any fraction of autarkic
agents.3
The prediction of the naive model is shown in Figure 1, which plots the probabilities
that each of the 40 naive agents will correctly guess the state in sparse and dense networks
with σ = 2. Because naive agents’ actions only depend on the number of their predecessors
choosing each of the two actions and not the order of these actions, recursively calculating
the distributions of actions is computationally feasible (see Appendix 6.2 for details). As
shown in Figure 1, early naive agents do worse under q = 14 because there is very little social
2Dasaratha and He (2019) consider agents with a continuous action space, but we implemented a binary
action space in the experiment for clarity. We felt it would be easier for subjects to make a binary choice
than to accurately report their exact belief.
3See the Appendix of a previous version of Dasaratha and He (2019), available at https://arxiv.org/
pdf/1703.02105v5.pdf.
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Figure 1: Learning accuracy on random networks with 40 naive agents, binary actions, and
σ2 = 4. Blue and red curves show the expected accuracy of different agents on networks
with link probabilities q = 14 and q =
3
4 , respectively.
information, but the comparison quickly switches as we examine later naive agents.
On the other hand, the rational-learning model predicts that later agents will have either
similar or greater accuracy on the dense network compared to the sparse network. Acemoglu,
Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011)’s results imply that in an environment matching our
experimental setup, rational agents will learn the true state in the long-run, regardless of
the network density. We can confirm that 40 rational agents are enough to approach this
asymptotic learning limit when q = 34 . To do this, we compute a lower bound for the
probability of correct learning for each agent i in the dense network of our experiment,
assuming all agents are rational Bayesians (see Appendix 6.1 for details). This lower bound
is based on (suboptimal) agent strategies that only depend on their own private signals and
the action of just one neighbor, as in the neighbor-choice functions in Lobel and Sadler
(2015). This exercise shows that the 33rd rational agent is correct at least 96.8% of the
time on dense networks, with the lower bound on accuracy continuing to increase up to the
40th agent, who is correct at least 97.5% of the time. In addition to suggesting that the
asymptotic result of Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011) very likely holds by the
40th agent, the fact that this lower bound for accuracy on the dense network is so close to
perfect learning proves the 40th rational agent could not perform substantially better on the
sparse network,4 contrary to the predicted improvement for the 40th naive agent shown in
Figure 1.
Intuitively one might also expect more connections to also help rational agents in the
4We prove these bounds because we are not aware of a computationally feasible method of calculating or
simulating the probability that rational agents are correct. Rahimian, Molavi, and Jadbabaie (2014) show
computing rational actions in another social learning environment is NP-hard.
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short- and medium-run as they can adjust for potential redundancies in information. For
example, on the complete network with continuous actions, rational agents can back out the
private signals of all predecessors by observing their actions, so every agent i does better on
the complete network than on any sparser network structure. We note, however, that exact
comparative statics of the rational model or variants are not known on random networks.
We experimentally test the competing predictions of the naive and the rational models
about how long-run accuracy varies with network density. We thus provide indirect evidence
for the naive inference assumption, complementing the direct measurement of behavior in
Eyster, Rabin, and Weizsacker (2018) and Mueller-Frank and Neri (2015).
Beyond providing another form of evidence, our experiment also contributes to under-
standing social learning by using the welfare-relevant outcome, namely the long-run accuracy
of actions, as the dependent variable. Even if individual behavior tends to match redundancy
neglect models in simple or stylized settings, one might worry that the theoretical implica-
tions of said models concerning aggregate learning need not hold in practice for complex
environments. For a policymaker who can alter the observation network, for instance, ex-
periments using welfare-relevant outcomes as their dependent variables give more explicit
guidance as to the consequences of different policies.
3 Experimental Design
We conducted our experiment on the online labor platform Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
using Qualtrics survey software.
We pre-registered our experimental protocol and regression specification prior to the
start of the experiment in August 2017. Our pre-registration included the target sam-
ple size (which was met exactly) and the dependent variable to measure the accuracy of
social learning. The pre-registration document can be found on the registry website at
https://aspredicted.org/yp6eq.pdf and is also included in the Appendix.
We recruited 1040 subjects satisfying the selection criteria described in the Appendix.
Each subject also needed to complete three comprehension questions (which were scenarios
in the game with a dominant choice); MTurk users who incorrectly answered one or more
comprehension questions were excluded from the experiment. The experiment was carried
out in autumn 2017.
In addition to comprehension questions, we restricted to subjects located in the United
States who had completed at least 50 previous MTurk tasks with a lifetime approval rate
of at least 90%. Subjects were not permitted to participate in more than one round of our
experiment. There were at most 15 subjects who did not complete all trials, implying a
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completion rate of at least 98.5%. These non-completers were excluded and replaced by new
subjects.
Each trial consisted of 40 agents who were asked to each make a binary guess between
two a priori equally likely states of the world, L (for left) and R (for right). The states
were color-coded to make instructions and observations more reader-friendly. Agents are
assigned positions in the sequence and move in order. Each MTurk subject participated in
10 trials, all in the same position (depending on when they participated in the experiment).
The grouping of subjects into trials was independent across trials. Subjects received $0.25
for completing the experiment and $0.25 per correct guess, for a maximum possible payment
of $2.75. Subjects ordinarily took less than 10 minutes to complete their participation and
earned on average $2.08, so the incentives were quite large for an MTurk task.
In each trial, every agent received a private signal, which had the Gaussian distribution
N (−1, 4) in state L and the Gaussian distribution N (1, 4) in state R. These distributions
were presented visually in the instructions. Along with the value of their signal, subjects
were told the probability of each state conditional on only their private signal.
Each trial was also associated with a density parameter, either q = 14 or q =
3
4 . A
random network was generated for each trial by linking each agent with each predecessor
with probability q. Each MTurk subject was assigned into either the “sparse” or the “dense”
treatment, then placed into 10 trials either all with q = 14 or all with q =
3
4 . So there were
520 subjects and 130 trials for each treatment. Agents were told the actions of each linked
predecessor and the link probability q (but not the full realized network, which could not be
presented succinctly).
In each trial, agents viewed their private signal and any social observations and were asked
to guess the state. States, signals, and networks were independently drawn across trials.
Experimental instructions and an example of a choice screen are shown in the Appendix.
4 Results
Let yi,j be the indicator random variable with yi,j = 1 if agent i in trial j correctly guesses
the state, yi,j = 0 otherwise. Define y˜j := 18
∑40
i=33 yi,j as the fraction of the last eight
agents in trial j who correctly guess the state. We test learning outcomes for the final eight
agents because welfare depends on long-run learning outcomes in large societies and these
agents better approximate long-run outcomes. By using only her private signal, an agent can
correctly guess the state 69.15% of the time.5 We call y˜j−0.6915 the gain from social learning
5In fact, 94% of the subjects assigned to the first position (who have no social observations) correctly use
their private signal.
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(1) (2)
FractionCorrect FractionCorrect
NetworkDensity -0.0923 -0.0923
(0.0406) (0.0406)
Constant 0.802 0.802
(0.0227) (0.0218)
Observations 260 260
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.016
(1) without robust SEs; (2) with robust SEs
Table 1: Regression results for the effect of network density on learning outcomes.
in trial j, as this quantity represents improvement relative to the autarky benchmark.
We find that the average gain from social learning is 8.73 percentage points for the q = 14
treatment and 4.12 percentage points for the q = 34 treatment. Social learning improves
accuracy on the sparse networks by twice as much as on the dense networks. To test for
statistical significance, we consider the regression
y˜j = β0 + β1qj + j
where qj ∈ {14 , 34} is the network density parameter for trial j. Recall that each subject was
assigned into ten random trials with the same network density and in the same sequential
position. This means for two different trials j ′ 6= j ′′ , the error terms j′ and j′′ are close to
independent since there are likely very few subjects who participated in both trials. Indeed,
our estimates are identical whether we use robust standard errors or not.
We estimate β1 = −0.092 with a p-value of 0.0239 (see Table 1). These findings are
consistent with naive updating but not with rational updating, as discussed in Section 2.6
This difference in the gains from social learning is not driven by different rates of autarky
among the two treatments for the last eight agents. We say an agent goes against her signal
if she guesses L when her signal is positive or guesses R when her signal is negative. Within
the last eight rounds, there are 138 instances of agents going against their signals in the q = 14
treatment, which is very close to the 136 instances of the same under the q = 34 treatment.
However, when agents go against their signals in the last eight rounds, they correctly guess
the state 81.88% of the time under the q = 14 treatment, but only 71.32% of the time under
6We pre-registered average accuracy in the last 8 agents (i.e last 20% of agents) as the dependent variable
for the experiment, but the regression result is robust to other definitions of y˜j . When y˜j encodes average
accuracy among the last m agents for any 4 ≤ m ≤ 12 (i.e. between last 10% and last 30% of the agents),
the estimate for β1 remains negative.
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the q = 34 treatment. This shows the observed difference in accuracy is due to social learning
being differentially effective on the two network structures.
However, the q = 34 treatment yields better learning outcomes for early agents. For
agents 10 through 20, the average guess accuracy is 72.24% under the q = 14 treatment
and 73.22% under the q = 34 treatment. As such, if we replace the dependent variable in
the pre-registered regression with overall accuracy y¯j := 140
∑40
i=1 yi,j, then we do not find a
statistically significant estimate for β1 (p-value of 0.663). This result is consistent with the
naive-learning model: according to the predictions of the naive model shown in Figure 1,
early agents are more accurate under q = 34 , but later agents are more accurate under q =
1
4 .
The point of overtaking happens at a later round in practice than in theory, because our
experimental subjects rely more on their private signal than predicted by the naive model,7
consistent with the meta-analysis of Weizsäcker (2010).
Our experiment was designed to compare long-run learning accuracy on different networks
instead of measuring individual behavior. We do not directly test alternate behavioral models
for two reasons. First, given the complex signal and network structures, such tests will be
very noisy in our data. Second, because the spaces of possible networks and actions have very
high dimension, determining the action each agent would take assuming common knowledge
of rationality is computationally infeasible. However, in the next subsection we provide
some evidence that our findings are driven by herding under naive inference rather than
other behavioral mechanisms.
4.1 Evidence of naive herding
In this section, we present three pieces of evidence suggesting that naive herding is the
mechanism responsible for the difference in learning accuracy between the two treatments.
(1) Distribution of overall accuracy. Figure 2 in Appendix 7 plots the distributions
subjects who correctly guess the state in the q = 14 and q =
3
4 treatments, across different
trials. The distribution under q = 34 has more extreme values than the one under q =
1
4 ,
and also a larger standard deviation (11.36 percentage points versus 9.12 percentage points).
This is suggestive evidence for naive herding. With denser networks, we simultaneously find
more trials where agents do very badly overall (from herding on the wrong state) and more
trials where agents do very well overall (from herding on the correct state).
(2) Effect of misleading early signals on the accuracy of later agents. Call a
private signal misleading if it is positive while the state is L, or if it is negative while the
state is R. If naive herding is the mechanism, we would expect misleading signals received by
7The overall frequency of agents going against their signals was 36.8% of the predicted frequency under
the naive model.
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early agents to be more harmful for eventual learning accuracy on denser networks than on
sparser networks. To test this, we expand our baseline regression to include two additional
regressors: the number mj of the first fifth of agents who receive misleading signals in trial
j, and its interaction effect with network density. That is, we estimate
y˜j = β0 + β1qj + β2mj + γ(qjmj) + j.
The difference in the marginal effect of a misleading early signal for learning accuracy on the
dense network (q = 34) versus on the sparse network (q =
1
4) is
1
2γ in the above specification.
As reported in Table 4 in Appendix 7, we find γ = 0.05 with a p-value of 0.0923. This
means each misleading signal among the first fifth of agents harms the average accuracy of
the last fifth of agents in the same trial by an extra 2.5 percentage points in dense networks
compared to sparse networks.
(3) Average uncertainty. Based on simulation evidence, we expect naive agents to
exhibit more agreement within denser networks. To test this prediction in the data, we
consider for each game a set of 30 moving windows centered around periods 6, 7, ... 35,
with each window spanning 11 consecutive periods. For each game j and each window w, we
compute rj,w ∈ {0, 111 , ..., 1} as the fraction of 11 agents in the window who guessed R, and
we let uj,w := rj,w · (1 − rj,w) be a measure of uncertainty within the window.8 In windows
where agents exhibit a greater degree of agreement, we will see a lower uj,w. Under herding,
we expect lower uncertainty on denser networks, as higher density accelerates convergence
to a (possibly mistaken) social consensus. We find in the data that the average uj,w is lower
among sparse networks than dense networks for all but 1 out of 30 windows. Numerically,
the naive herding theory predicts lower average uj,w on denser networks in all 30 windows.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our study provides experimental evidence on how the density of the observation network
affects people’s long-run accuracy in social-learning settings. We find that sparser networks
double the accuracy gains from social learning relative to denser networks. This finding also
provides indirect evidence supporting naive inference.
While the rational model predicts correct asymptotic social learning with minimal as-
sumptions on the social network, we conjecture that in practice, many structural properties
of the network can substantially alter long-run accuracy. Our empirical findings support this
8The value of uj,w would be unchanged if we instead defined rj,w as the fraction of the 11 agents in
window w who correctly guessed the state.
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conjecture for the case of network density, one of the most canonical network statistics. We
leave open the roles of other network structures as promising future work.
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Appendix
6 Theoretical Predictions in the Experimental Envi-
ronment
6.1 Bounding the Performance of Rational Agents
Consider 40 rational agents on a random network where each agent is linked to each of her
predecessors 34 of the time, i.i.d. across link realizations. Agents know their own neighbors
but have no further knowledge about the realization of the random network. The signal
structure and payoff structure match the experimental design in Section 3.
We provide a lower bound for the accuracy of agents 33 through 40 in the unique PBE
of the social-learning game. We first show that when every player uses the equilibrium
strategy, all agents learn at least as well as when everyone uses any constrained strategy
that chooses an action based on only own private signal and the action of the most recent
neighbor. We then exhibit payoffs under one such strategy, which give a lower bound on
rational performance.
Fix an arbitrary sequence of constrained strategies (σi) where σi : Si × {0, 1, ∅} →
∆({0, 1}) is only a function of i’s signal si and the action of the most recent predecessor that
i observes (σi(si, ∅) refers to i’s play if i does not observe any predecessor). Let ai denote i’s
(random) action induced by this sequence of strategies. Let a′i denote i’s (random) action
when all agents use the PBE strategy.
Claim 1. For all i, P[a′i = ω]≥ P[ai = ω].
Proof. The proof is by induction on i and the base case of i = 1 is clear. Suppose the claim
holds for i = 1, ..., n. Conditional on agent n+ 1 observing no predecessors, the claim again
holds as in the base case, so we can check the claim conditional on n+ 1 observing at least
one neighbor.
Let j be the most recent neighbor that n+ 1 observes. Then the rational agent observes
sn+1, a′j for some j ≤ n, and perhaps some other actions while the constrained agent only uses
sn+1 and aj in decision-making, where P[a′j = ω]≥ P[aj = ω] by the inductive hypothesis. By
garbling the observed action a′j, the rational agent could construct a random variable with the
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same joint distribution with ω as the less accurate action aj. Ignoring information other than
sn+1 and the garbled a′j, the rational agent n+1 could therefore follow a strategy that does as
well as agent n+1 under the strategy profile (σi). So we must have P[a′n+1 = ω]≥ P[an+1 = ω]
when everyone uses the PBE strategy.
We then numerically compute the values for P[a
i
= ω] under the optimal constrained
strategy, which are displayed in Table 2.
agent number
probability correct
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
0.9685 0.9695 0.9705 0.9714 0.9723 0.9731 0.9739 0.9746
Table 2: Lower bounds on the accuracy of rational agents on dense networks.
6.2 Performance of Naive Agents
Consider 40 naive agents on a random network where each agent is linked to each of her
predecessors with probability q, i.i.d. across link realizations. The signal structure and payoff
structure match the experimental design in Section 3.
We will compute the accuracy of each agent by a recursive calculation. Because naive
agents’ actions do not depend on the order of predecessors, behavior depends only on the
number of agents who have played L and the number of agents who have played R as well
as the network. We will compute the distribution over the number of agents from the first
n who have played L and the number who have played R recursively.
Assume the state is R. Let P (k, k′) be the probability that k of the first n agents play L
and k′ of the first n agents play R. We define P (k, k′) = 0 if k < 0 or k′ < 0. The posterior
log-likelihood of state R for a naive agent observing one action equal to R (and no signal) is
` = 2
σ2
· µ+ σφ(−µ/σ)1− Φ(−µ/σ) ,
where Φ and φ are the distribution function and probability density function of a standard
Gaussian random variable, respectively.
Then we have the recursive relation
P (k, k′) = P (k − 1, k′)∑i≤k−1,i′≤k′ B(i, k − 1, q)B(i′, k′, q)Φ(σ(i−i′)`−2µσ2 ) +
P (k, k′ − 1)∑i≤k,i′≤k′−1B(i, k, q)B(i′, k′ − 1, q)[1− Φ(σ(i−i′)`−2µσ2 )],
where B(i, k, q) is the probability a binomial distribution with parameters k and q is equal to
i. The first summand gives the probability of agent k+k′ choosing L after k−1 predecessors
13
choose L and the remainder choose R, and the second summand gives the probability of agent
k + k′ choosing R after k predecessors choose L and the remainder choose R. The binomial
coefficients correspond to the possible network realizations. Here we use naive inference,
which implies that only the number of observed agents choosing each action matters for
behavior and not their order.
From these distributions P (·, ·) we can compute the probability that agent n chooses the
correct action R:
n∑
k=0
P (k, n− k) ∑
i≤k,i′≤n−k
B(i, k, q)B(i′, n− k, q)[1− Φ(σ(i− i
′)`− 2µσ
2 )].
These probabilities, which we compute numerically, are displayed in Table 3 for agents 33
through 40.
agent number
accuracy with q = 1/4
accuracy with q = 3/4
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
0.8773 0.8780 0.8786 0.8792 0.8797 0.8801 0.8805 0.8808
0.7768 0.7768 0.7768 0.7768 0.7768 0.7768 0.7768 0.7768
Table 3: The accuracy of naive agents on sparse and dense networks.
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7 Relegated Figures and Tables
Distribution of overall accuracy for trials on sparse networks (p = 0.25)
fraction of subjects correctly guessing the state
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Distribution of overall accuracy for trials on dense networks (p = 0.75)
fraction of subjects correctly guessing the state
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Figure 2: Histograms of fractions of agents correctly guessing the state
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Dependent variable:
FractionCorrect
MisleadingEarlySignals 0.014
(0.017)
NetworkDensity 0.033
(0.082)
MisleadingEarlySignals×NetworkDensity −0.050∗
(0.030)
Constant 0.768∗∗∗
(0.045)
Observations 260
R2 0.040
Adjusted R2 0.029
Residual Std. Error 0.163 (df = 256)
F Statistic 3.566∗∗ (df = 3; 256)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4: Effect of misleading early signals.
8 Experimental Instructions
Instructions and an example choice follow. To avoid confusion, the instructions were modified
for player 1 in each round to exclude discussion of social observations.
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2EMHFWLYH<RXZLOOSOD\URXQGVRIDVRFLDOOHDUQLQJJDPH$WWKHVWDUWRIHDFKURXQGWKHFRPSXWHU
ZLOOUDQGRPO\FKRRVHDGLUHFWLRQIRUWKHURXQGZKLFKLVHLWKHU/()7RU5,*+7(DFKGLUHFWLRQLVHTXDOO\
OLNHO\WREHFKRVHQ$QHZGLUHFWLRQLVFKRVHQIRUHDFKURXQGZKLFKGRHVQ
WGHSHQGRQSUHYLRXV
URXQGV
,QHDFKURXQGDQXPEHURISDUWLFLSDQWVIURP$PD]RQ7XUNZLOOWDNHWXUQVJXHVVLQJWKHGLUHFWLRQ<RXZLOO
EHWKHWKSDUWLFLSDQWWRPDNHDJXHVVLQHDFKURXQG<RXZLOOUHFHLYHDERQXVRIIRUHDFKURXQG
ZKHUH\RXJXHVVWKHGLUHFWLRQFRUUHFWO\
3ULYDWHVLJQDOV,QHDFKURXQGHDFKSDUWLFLSDQWLQFOXGLQJ\RXZLOOSULYDWHO\UHFHLYHVRPHLQIRUPDWLRQ
DERXWWKHGLUHFWLRQLQWKHIRUPRIDQXPEHUZKLFKZHZLOOFDOOWKH³VLJQDO´'LIIHUHQWSDUWLFLSDQWVZLOOKDYH
GLIIHUHQWVLJQDOV:KHQWKHGLUHFWLRQLV/()7\RXUVLJQDOWHQGVWREHDPRUHQHJDWLYHQXPEHU:KHQWKH
GLUHFWLRQLV5,*+7\RXUVLJQDOWHQGVWREHDPRUHSRVLWLYHQXPEHU

7KHVHVLJQDOVDUHVRPHWLPHVLPSUHFLVHVRLWLVSRVVLEOHWKDWDIHZSOD\HUVPD\EHLQFOXGLQJ\RXFRXOG
UHFHLYHQHJDWLYHQXPEHUVDVWKHLUVLJQDOVHYHQZKHQWKHGLUHFWLRQLV5,*+7IRUH[DPSOH+RZHYHULWLV
KLJKO\OLNHO\WKDWPRVWRIWKHSOD\HUVLQHDFKURXQGZLOOUHFHLYHVLJQDOVWKDWFRUUHFWO\UHIOHFWWKHGLUHFWLRQ
6RFLDOOHDUQLQJ6LQFHWKLVLVDVRFLDOOHDUQLQJJDPHLQHDFKURXQG\RXZLOOREVHUYHWKHJXHVVHVRI
VRPHSUHYLRXVSDUWLFLSDQWVEHIRUH\RXPDNH\RXURZQJXHVV(DFKSDUWLFLSDQWLQFOXGLQJ\RXREVHUYHV
WKHJXHVVRIHDFKSUHYLRXVSDUWLFLSDQWZLWKFKDQFH

0RUHDERXWWKHVLJQDO:KHQWKHGLUHFWLRQLV/()7WKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIVLJQDOVLV
:KHQWKHGLUHFWLRQLV5,*+7WKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIVLJQDOVLV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,QHDFKURXQGZHZLOODOVRUHPLQG\RXZKDW\RXURZQSULYDWHVLJQDOLPSOLHVDERXWWKHSUREDELOLWLHVRIWKH
WZRGLUHFWLRQV
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This is round 1 (out of 10).
Your signal: -3.3968.
Based on your signal alone, there is 84.53% chance the direction is LEFT,
15.47% chance the direction is RIGHT.
Your observations:
Player 1 guessed RIGHT
Player 3 guessed RIGHT
Player 4 guessed LEFT
Player 5 guessed LEFT
Player 7 guessed RIGHT
Player 8 guessed RIGHT
Player 9 guessed LEFT
Player 10 guessed LEFT
Player 11 guessed LEFT
Player 12 guessed LEFT
Player 13 guessed LEFT
Player 15 guessed LEFT
Player 16 guessed LEFT
Player 17 guessed RIGHT
Player 18 guessed LEFT
What is your guess about the direction this round?
LEFT
RIGHT
 >> 
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